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Abstract
Popular reputation systems for linked networks can be manipulated by spammers who strate-
gically place links. The reputation of node v is interpreted as the world’s opinion of v’s im-
portance. In PageRank [7], v’s own opinion can be seen to have considerable influence on her
reputation, where v expresses a high opinion of herself by participating in short directed cycles.
In contrast, we show that expected hitting time — the time to reach v in a random walk —
measures essentially the same quantity as PageRank, but excludes v’s opinion. We make these
notions precise, and show that a reputation system based on hitting time resists tampering by
individuals or groups who strategically place outlinks. We also present an algorithm to effi-
ciently compute hitting time for all nodes in a massive graph; conventional algorithms do not
scale adequately. Our algorithm, which applies to any random walk with restart, exploits a re-
lationship between PageRank and hitting time in random walks with restart. This relationship
also provides novel insights into spam detection and PageRank computation.
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0514429. Any
opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation (NSF).
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1 Introduction
Reputation and ranking systems are an essential part of web search and e-commerce. The general
idea is that the reputation of one participant is determined by the endorsements of others; for
example, one web page endorses another by linking to it. However, any web user knows that not all
participants are honorable — spammers will do their best to manipulate a search engine’s rankings.
A very basic requirement for a reputation system is that individuals should not be able to improve
their own reputation using simple self-endorsement strategies, like participating in short cycles to
boost PageRank. Many popular systems, including PageRank, fail in this regard. Since PageRank
enjoys many nice properties, it is instructive to see where things go wrong.
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph (e.g, the web). PageRank assigns a score pi(v) to each
node v, where pi is defined to be the stationary distribution of a random walk on G, giving the
pleasing interpretation that the score of page v is the fraction of time a web surfer spends there if
she randomly follows links forever. For technical reasons, the random walk is modified to restart in
each step with probability α, jumping to a page chosen uniformly at random. This ensures that pi
exists and is efficient to compute. Then a well-known fact about Markov chains [1] says that 1/pi(v)
is equal to the expected return time of v, the number of steps it takes a random walk starting at
v to return to v. A heuristic argument for this equivalence is that a walk returning to v every r
steps on average should spend 1/r of all time steps there.
Despite its popularity, one can easily manipulate return time with a strategy that changes only
outlinks. Intuitively, a node v should only link to nodes from which a random walk is expected to
return to v very quickly. By partnering with just one other node to form a 2-cycle with no other
outlinks, v ensures a return in two steps — the minimum possible without self-loops — unless the
walk jumps first. In this fashion, v can often boost its PageRank by a factor of 3 to 4 for typical
settings of α [9]. However, this strategy relies on manipulating the portion of the walk before the
first jump: the jump destination is independent of v’s outlinks, and return time is determined once
the walk reaches v again, so v’s outlinks have no further effect. This suggests eliminating the initial
portion of the walk and measuring reputation by the time to hit v following a restart, called the
hitting time of node v from the restart distribution. This paper develops a reputation system based
on hitting time that is provably resistant to manipulation. Our main contributions are:
• In Theorem 1, we develop a precise relationship between expected return time and expected
hitting in a random walk with restart, and show that the hitting time of v is completely
determined by the probability that v is reached before the first jump.
• In Theorem 2, we prove that a reputation system based on hitting time resists manipulation,
using natural definitions of reputation and influence derived from Theorem 1. For example,
node v has a limited amount of influence that depends on her reputation, and she may spread
that influence using outlinks to increase others’ reputations. However, node v cannot alter her
own reputation with outlinks, nor can she damage w’s reputation by more than her original
influence on w. Furthermore, the advantage that v gains by purchasing new nodes, often
called sybils of v, is limited by the restart probability of the sybils.
• To realize a reputation system based on hitting time we present an efficient algorithm to
simultaneously compute hitting time for all nodes. In addition to one PageRank calcula-
tion, our algorithm uses Monte Carlo sampling with running time that is linear in |V | for
given accuracy and confidence parameters. This is a significant improvement over traditional
algorithms, which require a large-scale computation for each node.1
1Standard techniques can simultaneously compute hitting time from all possible sources to a single target node
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We mention a few additional consequences of our work in less detail. For example, we describe a
Monte Carlo algorithm to find the most reputable nodes in time that is independent of the size of
the graph. We give an example showing that Theorem 1 can be used to easily reason about optimal
strategies for the placement of links to maximize reputation. Finally, we show how to pre-compute
a small number of values per node to quickly and accurately estimate the hitting time or PageRank
for any choice of restart probability α that is not too small.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss related work. In section
3 we present Theorem 1, giving the characterization of hitting time that is the foundation for the
following sections. In section 4 we develop a reputation system using hitting time and show that
it is resistant to manipulation. In section 5 we present algorithms for computing hitting time. In
section 6 we discuss additional consequences of Theorem 1.
2 Related Work
PageRank [7] and HITS [23] were early reputation systems used for web search. Since then, PageR-
ank has been adapted to a variety of applications: personalized web search [30], web spam detec-
tion [18], and trust systems in peer-to-peer networks [22]. Each of these uses the same general
formulation and our work applies to all of them. Recently, personalized PageRank was used as the
basis of a graph partitioning algorithm that runs in nearly-linear time [3].
Much work has focused on the PageRank system itself, studying computation methods, con-
vergence properties, stability and sensitivity, and, of course, implementation techniques. See [24]
for a survey of this wide body of work. Computationally, the Monte Carlo methods in [12] and [4]
are similar to our algorithms for hitting time. They use a probabilistic formulation of PageRank
in terms of a short random walk [21] that permits efficient sampling. In particular, we will use the
same idea as [12] to efficiently implement many random walks simultaneously in a massive graph,
without requiring random access.
Manipulability of PageRank falls under the umbrella of stability under perturbation. [29] gave an
early stability result: the total change in PageRank can not be too great if only low PageRank pages
change their links; their bounds were improved by [5]. [10] showed that PageRank is monotonic
— the addition of an inlink cannot decrease a page’s PageRank. [6] defined rank-stability, which
captures the idea that small changes to the link structure should not dramatically change the
rankings given by an algorithm, and [25] showed that PageRank is not rank-stable. Recent works
have cast the stability question in a strategic light: how can a group of selfish nodes place outlinks
to optimize their PageRank, and how can we detect such nodes [5, 9, 15–17, 27, 31]? In particular,
[5, 9, 16] all describe the manipulation strategy mentioned in the introduction.
For a more general treatment of reputation systems in the presence of strategic agents, [13] is
a nice overview with some specific results from the literature. [2] gives an axiomatic treatment of
reputation systems and incentive compatibility, showing possibility and impossibility results under
different combinations of axioms. [8] proves an impossibility result that relates to our work — a
wide class of reputation systems (which includes ours) cannot be resistant to a particular attack
called the sybil attack [11]. However, their definition of resistance is very strong, and our results
can be viewed as positive results under a relaxation of this requirement. We will discuss sybils
in section 5. [22] uses a central mechanism to make EigenTrust (essentially PageRank applied to
peer-to-peer systems) provably non-manipulable; the mechanism prohibits links between certain
nodes.
using a system of linear equations. However, what is desired for reputation systems is the hitting time from one
source, or in this case a distribution, to all possible targets.
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Hitting time is a classical quantity of interest in Markov chains. See chapter 2 of [1] for an
overview. The exact terminology and definitions vary slightly: we define hitting time as a random
variable, but sometimes it is defined as the expectation of the same random variable. Also, the term
first passage time is sometimes used synonymously. Hitting time has appeared in contexts related
to ours: in [26], hitting time between pairs of nodes is used as a measure of proximity to predict
link formation in a social network. [20] uses hitting time to measure similarity between nodes; in
particular, their expected-f meeting distance is the hitting time of a set of nodes in a random walk
(with restart) on a product graph. [10] uses hitting time to analyze the monotonicity of PageRank.
Finally, the relationship between hitting time and return time in a random walk with restart is
related to work on regenerative stochastic processes — processes that restart at certain intervals.
In fact, Theorem 1 can be derived as a special case of a general result about such processes, where
the process is Markovian and the regeneration times are geometric. See equation (15) in [19] and
the references therein for a more general treatment.
3 Characterizing Hitting Time
Our goal is to build a reputation system using hitting time that is both informative and manip-
ulation-resistant. This section will pave the way towards both goals by stating and proving Theorem
1. Part (i) of the theorem relates hitting time to return time — then we argue that hitting time
is informative by comparison with PageRank — the two are essentially the same except for nodes
where the random walk is likely to return before jumping, a known sign of manipulation. Part
(ii) proves that the hitting time of v is completely determined by the probability that v is reached
before the first jump; this will lead to precise notions of manipulation-resistance in section 4.
3.1 Preliminaries
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph. Consider the standard random walk on G, where the first node
is chosen from starting distribution q, then at each step the walk follows an outgoing link from
the current node chosen uniformly at random. Let (Xt)t≥0 be the sequence of nodes visited by the
walk. Then Pr [X0 = v] = q(v), and Pr [Xt = v | Xt−1 = u] = 1/outdegree(u) if (u, v) ∈ E, and
zero otherwise. Here, we require outdegree(u) > 0.2 Now, suppose the walk is modified to restart
with probability α at each step, meaning the next node is chosen from the starting distribution
(henceforth, restart distribution) instead of following a link. The new transition probabilities are:
Pr [Xt = v | Xt−1 = u] =
{
αq(v) + 1−αoutdegree(u) if (u, v) ∈ E
αq(v) otherwise
.
We call this the α-random walk on G, and we parametrize quantities of interest by the restart
probability α. A typical setting is α = 0.15, so a jump occurs every 1/.15 ≈ 7 steps in expectation.
The hitting time of v is Hα(v) = min{t : Xt = v}. The return time of v is Rα(v) = min{t ≥ 1 :
Xt = v | X0 = v}. When v is understood, we simply write Hα and Rα. We write H and R for the
hitting time and return time in a standard random walk.
3.2 Theorem 1
Before stating Theorem 1, we make the useful observation that we can split the α-random walk
into two independent parts: (1) the portion preceding the first jump is the beginning of a standard
2This is a technical condition that can be resolved in a variety of ways, for example, by adding self-loops to nodes
with no outlinks.
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random walk, and (2) the portion following the first jump is an α-random walk independent of
the first portion. The probability that the first jump occurs at time t is (1− α)t−1α, i.e., the first
jump time J is a geometric random variable with parameter α, independent of the nodes visited
by the walk. Then our model for the α-random walk is: (1) start a standard random walk, (2)
independently choose the first jump time J from a geometric distribution, and (3) at time J begin
a new α-random walk. Hence we can express the return time and hitting time of v recursively:
Rα =
{
R if R < J
J +Hα otherwise
, Hα =
{
H if H < J
J +H ′α otherwise
. (1)
Here H ′α is an independent copy of Hα. It is convenient to abstract from our specific setting and
state Theorem 1 about general random variables of this form.
Theorem 1. Let R and H be independent, nonnegative, integer-valued random variables, and let
J be a geometric random variable with parameter α. Define Rα and Hα as in (1). Then,
(i) E [Rα] = Pr [R ≥ J ]
(
1
α + E [Hα]
)
, (ii) E [Hα] = 1α · Pr[H≥J ]Pr[H<J ] , (iii) E [Rα] = 1α · Pr[R≥J ]Pr[H<J ] .
Part (i) relates expected return time to expected hitting time: Pr [R ≥ J ] is the probability that
the walk does not return before jumping. On the web, for example, we expect Pr [R ≥ J ] to be
close to 1 for most pages, so the two measures are roughly equivalent. However, pages attempting
to optimize PageRank can drive Pr [R ≥ J ] much lower, achieving an expected return time that is
much lower than expected hitting time.
For parts (ii) and (iii), we adopt the convention that Pr [H < J ] = 0 implies E [Hα] = E [Rα] =
∞, corresponding to the case when v is not reachable from any node with positive restart prob-
ability. To gain some intuition for part (ii) (part (iii) is similar), we can think of the random
walk as a sequence of independent explorations from the restart distribution “looking” for node
v. Each exploration succeeds in finding v with probability Pr [H < J ], so the expected number of
explorations until success is 1/Pr [H < J ]. The expected number of steps until an exploration is
terminated by a jump is 1/α, so a rough estimate of hitting time is 1α · 1Pr[H<J ] . Of course, this is an
overestimate because the final exploration is cut short when v is reached, and the expected length
of an exploration conditioned on not reaching v is slightly shorter than 1/α. It turns out that
Pr [H ≥ J ] is exactly the factor needed to correct the estimate, due to the useful fact about geo-
metric random variables3 stated in Lemma 1. We stress that the hitting time of v in the α-random
walk is completely determined by Pr [H < J ], the probability that a given exploration succeeds;
this will serve as the foundation for our reputation system.
Lemma 1. Let X and J be independent random variables such that X is nonnegative and integer-
valued, and J is a geometric random variable with parameter α. Then E [min(X, J)] = 1αPr [X ≥ J ].
Lemma 1 is proved in the appendix. Interestingly, Lemma 1 uniquely characterizes a geometric
random variable, so the conclusions of Theorem 1 do not hold for arbitrary J . This is also proved
in the appendix.
Proof of Theorem 1. We rewrite Rα = min(R, J) + I{R ≥ J}Hα, where I{R ≥ J} is the indicator
variable for the event R ≥ J . Note that I{R ≥ J} and Hα are independent. Then, using linearity
of expectation and Lemma 1,
E [Rα] = E [min(R, J)] + Pr [R ≥ J ]E [Hα]
3We mentioned that Theorem 1 can be derived from a result about regenerative stochastic processes [19]. In fact,
Theorem 1 captures most of the generality; to write recurrences as in (1), the process need not be Markovian, it is
only necessary that the process following a restart is a replica of the original. The only non-general assumption made
is that J is a geometric random variable; this simplifies the conclusions.
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=
1
α
Pr [R ≥ J ] + Pr [R ≥ J ]E [Hα]
= Pr [R ≥ J ]
(
1
α
+ E [Hα]
)
.
This proves part (i). For part (ii), we take R to be a copy of H in part (i), giving
E [Hα] = Pr [H ≥ J ]
(
1
α
+ E [Hα]
)
.
Solving this expression for E [Hα] gives (ii). Part (iii) is obtained by substituting (ii) into (i).
4 Manipulation-resistance
In this section we develop a reputation system based on hitting time, and quantify the extent to
which an individual can tamper with reputations. It is intuitively clear that u cannot improve
her own hitting time by placing outlinks, but we would also like to limit the damage that u can
cause to v’s reputation. Specifically, u should only be able to damage v’s reputation if u was
responsible for v’s reputation in the first place. Furthermore, u should not have a great influence
on the reputation of too many others. To make these ideas precise, we define reputation using
Pr [H < J ] instead of E [Hα]. By Theorem 1, either quantity determines the other — they are
roughly inversely proportional — and Pr [H < J ] is convenient for reasoning about manipulation.
Definition 1. Let f(v) = Pr [H(v) < J ] be the reputation of v.
In words, f(v) is the probability that a random walk hits v before jumping. Of all walks that reach
v before jumping, an attacker u can only manipulate those that hit u first. This leads to our notion
of influence.
Definition 2. Let g(u, v) = Pr [H(u) < H(v) < J ] be the influence of u on v.
Definition 3. Let g(u) =
∑
v g(u, v) be the total influence of u.
To quantify what can change when u manipulates outlinks, suppose G′ is obtained from G by
the addition or deletion of edges originating at u. Let f ′ and g′ be the reputation and influence
functions in G′. It is convenient to formalize the intuition that u has no control over the random
walk until it hits u for the first time.
Definition 4. For an event A, we say that A is u-invariant if PrG [A] = PrG′ [A]. If A is u-
invariant, we also say that the quantity Pr [A] is u-invariant.
Lemma 2. An event A is u-invariant if the occurrence or non-occurrence of A is determined by
time H(u).
Lemma 2 is proved in the appendix. With the definitions in place, we can quantify how much
u can manipulate reputations.
Theorem 2. Let v be any node in V . Then
(i) f ′(u) = f(u) (cannot alter own reputation),
(ii) g(u, v) ≤ f(u) (influence cannot exceed reputation),
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(iii) f ′(v) ≥ f(v)− g(u, v) (cannot damage v’s reputation by more than influence on v),
(iv) f ′(v) ≤ f(v) + f(u) − g(u, v) (cannot boost v’s reputation by more than reputation minus
current influence),
(v) g(u) ≤ 1αf(u) (total influence cannot exceed 1α times reputation).
Proof. For part (i), we have f ′(u) = PrG′ [H(u) < J ] = PrG [H(u) < J ] = f(u), since H(u) < J
is u-invariant. For part (ii), a walk that hits u then v before jumping contributes equally to u’s
reputation and u’s influence on v: g(u, v) = Pr [H(u) < H(v) < J ] ≤ Pr [H(u) < J ] = f(u). For
parts (iii-iv), we split walks that hit v before jumping into those that hit u first and those that
don’t:
f(v) = Pr [H(v) < J ]
= Pr [H(u) < H(v) ∧ H(v) < J ] + Pr [H(u) ≥ H(v) ∧ H(v) < J ]
= g(u, v) + Pr [H(u) ≥ H(v) ∧ H(v) < J ]
The term Pr [H(u) ≥ H(v) ∧ H(v) < J ] is u-invariant, and equal to f(v) − g(u, v) by the above,
so repeating the calculation for G′ gives f ′(v) = g′(u, v) + f(v) − g(u, v). By parts (i) and (ii),
0 ≤ g′(u, v) ≤ f ′(u) = f(u), and substituting these bounds into the expression for f ′(v) gives (iii)
and (iv).
Part (v) uses the observation that not too many nodes can be hit after u but before the first
jump. Let L = |{v : H(u) < H(v) < J}| be the number of all such nodes. Then,
E [L] = E
[∑
v
I{H(u) < H(v) < J}
]
=
∑
v
Pr [H(u) < H(v) < J ] = g(u).
But L cannot exceed J −min(H(u), J), so
g(u) = E [L] ≤ E [J ]− E [min(H(u), J)]
= E [J ] (1− Pr [H(u) ≥ J ])
= E [J ] Pr [H(u) < J ]
=
1
α
f(u).
The equality in the second line is due to Lemma 1.
4.1 Manipulating the Rankings
Theorem 2 quantifies how much a node u can manipulate reputation values, but often we are more
concerned with how much u can manipulate the ranking, specifically, how far u can advance by
manipulating outlinks only. The limited influence of u in parts (ii) and (v) of the theorem yield
two immediate corollaries, proved in the appendix. If f(u) < f(v), we say that u meets v if
f ′(u) = f ′(v), and u surpasses v if f ′(u) > f ′(v).
Corollary 1. Node u cannot surpass a node that is at least twice as reputable.
Corollary 2. Node u can meet or surpass at most 1αγ nodes that are more reputable than u by a
factor of at least (1 + γ).
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4.2 Reputation and Influence of Sets
We have discussed reputation and influence in terms of individual nodes for ease of exposition,
but all of the definitions and results generalize when we consider the reputation and influence of
sets of nodes. Let U,W ⊆ V , and recall that H(W ) = minw∈W H(w) is the hitting time of the
set W . Then we define f(W ) = Pr [H(W ) < J ] to be the reputation of W , we define g(U,W ) =
Pr [H(U) < H(W ) < J ] to be the influence of U onW , and we define g(U) =
∑
v∈V g(U, {v}) to be
the total influence of U . With these definitions, exact analogues of Theorem 2 and its corollaries
hold for any U,W ⊆ V , with essentially the same proofs. Note that U and W need not be disjoint,
in which case it is possible that H(U) = H(W ). We omit further details.
4.3 Sybils
In online environments, it is often easy for a user to create new identities, called sybils, and use
them to increase her own reputation, even without obtaining any new inlinks from non-sybils. A
wide class of reputation systems is vulnerable to sybil attacks [8], and, in the extreme, hitting
time can be heavily swayed as well. For example, if u places enough sybils so the random walk
almost surely starts at a sybil, then adding links from each sybil to u ensures the walk hits u by
the second step unless it jumps. In this fashion, u can achieve reputation almost 1 − α and drive
the reputation of all non-sybils to zero. We’ll see that this is actually the only way that sybils
can aid u, by gathering restart probability and funneling it towards u. So an application can limit
the effect of sybils by limiting the restart probability granted to new nodes. In fact, applications
like Personalized PageRank [30] and TrustRank [18] are already immune, since they place all of
the restart probability on a fixed set of known or trusted nodes. Applications like web search that
give equal restart probability to each node are more vulnerable, but in cases like the web the sheer
number of nodes requires an attacker to place many sybils to have a substantial effect. This stands
in stark contrast with PageRank, where one sybil is enough to employ the 2-cycle self-endorsement
strategy and increase PageRank by several times [9].
To model the sybil attack, suppose G′ = (V ∪ S,E′) is obtained from G by a sybil attack
launched by u. That is, the sybil nodes S are added, and links originating at u or inside S can be
set arbitrarily. All other links must not change, with the exception that those originally pointing
to u can be directed anywhere within S ∪ {u}. Let q′ be the new restart distribution, assuming
that q′ diverts probability to S but does not redistribute probability within V . Specifically, if
ρ =
∑
s∈S q
′(s) is the probability alloted to sybils, we require that q′(v) = (1− ρ)q(v) for all v ∈ V .
Let f ′ be the new reputation function.
Theorem 3. Let U = {u}∪S be the nodes controlled by u, and let v be any other node in V . Then
(i) f ′(u) ≤ f ′(U) = (1− ρ)f(u) + ρ,
(ii) f ′(v) ≥ (1− ρ)(f(v)− g(u, v)),
(iii) f ′(v) ≤ (1− ρ)(f(v) + f(u)− g(u, v)) + ρ.
Compared with Theorem 2, the only additional effect of sybils is to diminish all reputations by
a factor of (1− ρ), and increase the reputation of certain target nodes by up to ρ.
Proof of Theorem 3. We split the attack into two steps, first observing how reputations change
when the sybils are added but no links are changed, then applying Theorem 2 for the step when
only links change. Let G+ = (V ∪S,E) be the intermediate graph with sybils but no new links, and
let f+ and g+ be the reputation and influence functions in G+. Assume the sybils have self-loops
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so the transition probabilities are well-defined. We can compute f+(U) by conditioning on whether
X0 lands in V (probability 1− ρ) or S (probability ρ).
f+(U) = (1− ρ) · PrG+ [H(U) < J | X0 ∈ V ] + ρ · PrG+ [H(U) < J | X0 ∈ S]
= (1− ρ) · PrG [H(u) < J ] + ρ
= (1− ρ)f(u) + ρ.
In the second step, PrG+ [H(U) < J | X0 ∈ V ] = PrG [H(u) < J ] because hitting U in G+ is equiv-
alent to hitting u in G; all edges outside U are unchanged, and all edges to U originally went to u.
Also the conditional distribution of X0 given X0 ∈ V is equal to q, by our assumption on q′. The
term PrG+ [H(U) < J | X0 ∈ S] is equal to one, since X0 ∈ S implies H(U) = 0 < J . A similar
calculation gives
f+(v) = (1− ρ)f(v) + ρ · PrG+ [H(v) < J | X0 ∈ S] = (1− ρ)f(v).
The term PrG+ [H(v) < J | X0 ∈ S] vanishes because S is disconnected, so a walk that starts in
S cannot leave. Similarly, g+(U, v) = (1 − ρ)g(u, v). Finally, we complete the sybil attack by
modifying the edges originating in U , and apply Theorem 2 (the version generalized to deal with
sets) to f+ and g+. Parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of this theorem are obtained by direct substitution
using parts (i), (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 can also be generalized to deal with sets.
5 Algorithms
To realize a reputation system based on hitting time, we require an algorithm to efficiently compute
the reputation of all nodes. Theorem 1 suggests several possibilities. Recall that pi(v) is the
PageRank of v. We have the following tools in our toolbox, which can be combined to obtain
algorithms satisfying different requirements for accuracy and running time: (1) E [Rα(v)] = 1/pi(v)
can be computed efficiently for all nodes using a standard PageRank algorithm, (2) Pr [R(v) ≥ J ]
can be estimated efficiently by Monte Carlo sampling, and (3) Pr [H(v) < J ] can be estimated
efficiently by Monte Carlo sampling when this quantity is not too small. The distinction between
the last two items is important. We can get one sample of Pr [H(v) < J ] or Pr [R(v) ≥ J ] by
running a random walk until it first jumps, which takes about 1/α steps. However Pr [H(v) < J ]
may be infinitesimal, requiring a huge number of independent samples to obtain a good estimate.
On the other hand, Pr [R(v) ≥ J ] is bounded below by α since the walk has α chance of jumping
in the very first step. If self-loops are disallowed, we obtain a better lower bound of 1 − (1 − α)2,
the probability the walk jumps in the first two steps . For now we focus on Pr [R(v) ≥ J ].
5.1 Algorithm for Hitting Time
In this section we describe an efficient Monte Carlo algorithm to simultaneously compute hitting
time for all nodes. To obtain accuracy  with probability at least 1 − δ, the time required will be
O( log(1/δ)
2α2
|V |) in addition to the time of one PageRank calculation. The algorithm is:
1. Compute pi using a standard PageRank algorithm.4 Then E [Rα(v)] = 1/pi(v).
4PageRank algorithms are typically iterative and incur some error. Our analysis bounds the additional error
incurred by our algorithm.
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2. For each node v, run k random walks starting from v until the walk either returns to v or
jumps. Let yv = 1k · (# of walks that jump before returning to v).
3. Use yv as an estimate for Pr [R(v) ≥ J ] in part (i) or (iii) of Theorem 1 to compute E [Hα(v)]
or Pr [H(v) < J ].
We suggested that a low value of Pr [R(v) ≥ J ] may be a good indicator of PageRank manipulation.
To estimate this quantity for use in spam detection, steps 1 and 3 may be omitted. How many
samples are needed to achieve high accuracy? Let µ = Pr [R(v) ≥ J ] be the quantity estimated by
yv. We call yv an (, δ)-approximation for µ if Pr [|yv − µ| ≥ µ] ≤ δ. A standard application of the
Chernoff bound (see [28] p. 254) shows that yv is an (, δ)-approximation if k ≥ (3 ln(2/δ))/2µ.
Using the fact that µ ≥ α, it is sufficient that k ≥ (3 ln(2/δ))/2α. Since each walk terminates in
1
α steps in expectation, the total expected number of steps is no more than
3 ln(2/δ)
2α2
|V |.
For massive graphs like the web that do not easily fit into main memory, it is not feasible to
collect the samples in step 2 of the algorithm sequentially, because each walk requires random access
to the edges, which is prohibitively expensive for data structures stored on disk. We describe a
method from [12] to collect all samples simultaneously making efficient use of disk I/O.
Conceptually, the idea is to run all walks simultaneously and incrementally by placing tokens on
the nodes recording the location of each random walk. Then we can advance all tokens by a single
step in one pass through the entire graph. Assuming the adjacency list is stored on disk sorted by
node, we store the tokens in a separate list sorted in the same order. Each token records the node
where it originated to determine if it returns before jumping. Then in one pass through both lists,
we load the neighbors of each node into memory and process each of its tokens, terminating the
walk and updating yu if appropriate, else choosing a random outgoing edge to follow and updating
the token. Updated tokens are written to the end of a new unsorted token list, and after all tokens
are processed, the new list is sorted on disk to be used in the next pass.
The number of passes is bounded by the walk that takes the longest to jump, which is not
completely satisfactory, so in practice we can stop after a fixed number of steps t, knowing that
the contribution of walks longer than t is nominal for large enough t, since Pr [R ≥ J ∧ J > t] ≤
Pr [J > t] = (1− α)t, which decays exponentially.
5.2 Finding Highly Reputable Nodes Quickly
Earlier we noted that f(v) = Pr [H(v) < J ] is troublesome to estimate because it may be small.
However, sampling f(v) has the very nice property that a single random walk gives a sample of
f(v) for all nodes, and it may well be the case that we don’t care about nodes for which f(v) is
small. For example suppose we want to label nodes as high-reputation if f(v) exceeds some fixed
threshold c, and low-reputation otherwise. It will be very difficult to classify nodes with reputation
almost exactly c, so we relax the problem slightly and allow either classification for some small
interval [a, b] containing c. Let  = b−ab . Then we have the following result, proved in the appendix.
Theorem 4. Using O(log(1/δ)/a2)Monte Carlo samples, we can label all nodes as high or low rep-
utation, such that the expected number of mislabeled nodes is at most δ|V |. With O(log(|V |/δ)/a2)
samples, we can classify all nodes correctly with probability at least 1− δ.
The first result does not depend on the size of the graph, only on the threshold parameters a and
. For graphs with highly skewed reputation distributions, a can be set to a high value to find the
most reputable nodes very quickly. It is likely that real-world graphs will have skewed reputation
distributions: for example, PageRank on the web graph has been observed to follow a power-law
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distribution [9]. Also, the thresholds need not be set in advance, so Theorem 4 can be used to give
on-the-fly confidence intervals for the discovery of reputable nodes.
6 Additional Consequences of Theorem 1
Dissecting the quantities in Theorem 1 provides some additional insights into PageRank and hitting
time. To start, the quantities Pr [R < J ] and Pr [H < J ] — which completely determine expected
return time and hitting time — are polynomials in 1−α, with coefficients given by the distributions
of R and H:
Pr [H < J ] =
∞∑
t=0
Pr [H = t] Pr [J > t] =
∞∑
t=0
Pr [H = t] (1− α)t. (2)
Similarly, Pr [R < J ] =
∑∞
t=0 Pr [R = t] (1 − α)t. An immediate consequence is that E [Rα] and
E [Hα] do not depend particularly on the link structure of G, only on the distributions induced on
R and H. Then we can easily reason about PageRank and hitting time in certain graph structures.
Proposition 1. Let S be the star graph where nodes {1, . . . , k−1} link only to k, and k links to at
least one of {1, . . . , k − 1}. Then S minimizes both expected return time and expected hitting time
of k over all graphs with k vertices and no self-loops.
Proof. H(k) is always 0 or 1, the minimum possible. Similarly, R(k) is always 2, also the minimum
possible since we prohibit self-loops. Then by (2), S simultaneously maximizes Pr [H(k) < J ] and
Pr [R(k) < J ], so by Theorem 1, S minimizes E [Rα(k)] and E [Hα(k)].
This reasoning holds even if S is a subgraph of G and we consider all possible arrangements
of the links within S. We need the additional fact, proved in the previous section, that H(S) is
independent of the links inside S. Then arranging S as a star ensures that H(k) is either H(S)
or H(S) + 1, always the minimum possible, and R(k) is still 2. This gives a very simple proof of
technical results from [5] and [16] describing the optimal way for a group of pages to boost the
PageRank of a single target.
Another consequence of (2) is that pre-computing Pr [H = t] for small values of t gives a good
estimate for Pr [H < J ] for all values of α that are not too small, just by taking the low-order terms
of the polynomial. The contribution of all terms of degree ` or more is at most (1− α)`, so taking
the first ` − 1 terms for ` ≥ log / log (1− α0) gives error at most  for all α ≥ α0. An analogous
result holds for Pr [R < J ].
7 Conclusion
We have explored the use of hitting time as a reputation system. Hitting time is resistant to
manipulation: an individual cannot alter her own reputation, and can alter another’s reputation by
only a limited amount. To quantify this amount, we developed a definition of influence, and showed
that influence is limited by reputation. We presented algorithms to efficiently compute hitting time
on large graphs, making it viable for real world applications. Our work also has consequences for
spam detection and PageRank computation.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that J is the time of the first success in a sequence of independent trials
that succeed with probability α, so Pr [J > t] = (1− α)t, and Pr [J ≤ t] = 1 − (1− α)t. For fixed
x, we have
E [min(X, J)] =
∞∑
t=0
Pr [min(X, J) > t]
=
∞∑
t=0
∞∑
x=0
Pr [X = x] Pr [min(X, J) > t | X = x]
=
∞∑
x=0
Pr [X = x]
∞∑
t=0
Pr [min(x, J) > t] (using independence)
=
∞∑
x=0
Pr [X = x]
x−1∑
t=0
Pr [J > t]
=
∞∑
x=0
Pr [X = x]
x−1∑
t=0
(1− α)t
=
∞∑
x=0
Pr [X = x]
1− (1− α)x
1− (1− α)
=
∞∑
x=0
Pr [X = x]
Pr [J ≤ x]
α
=
1
α
Pr [X ≥ J ]
Note that if J is any random variable on the positive integers, then Lemma 1 uniquely characterizes
J as a geometric random variable. To see this, observe that min(x, J)−min(x−1, J) is an indicator
variable for the event that J ≥ x. Then for fixed x,
Pr [J ≥ x] = E [min(x, J)]− E [min(x− 1, J)]
=
1
α
(Pr [x ≥ J ]− Pr [x− 1 ≥ J ]) (by Lemma 1)
=
1
α
Pr [J = x] .
Applying this for all x ≥ 0 and using the boundary condition Pr [J ≥ 1] = 1, we can set up a
recurrence that uniquely defines the distribution of J .
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B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. It is enough to show that PrG [A ∧H(u) = t] = PrG′ [A ∧H(u) = t] for all t ≥ 0. Our condi-
tions on A are vague about the case H(u) =∞; to be definite, assume that PrG [A ∧H(u) =∞] =
PrG′ [A ∧H(u) =∞] = 0. For finite t, let Wu,t be the set of all walks that first hit u at step
t. Specifically, Wu,t = {w0 . . . wt : wt = u, wi 6= u for i < t}. For w = w0 . . . wt, let Pr [w] be
shorthand for the probability of the walk w:
Pr [w] = Pr [X0 = w0] Pr [X1 = w1 | X0 = w0] . . .Pr [Xt = wt | Xt−1 = wt−1] .
Then for w ∈ Wu,t, the transition probabilities in the expression above are independent of u’s
outlinks, so PrG [w] = PrG′ [w]. Finally, since A is determined by time H(u), there is a function
IA :Wu,t → {0, 1} that indicates the occurrence or non-occurrence of A for each w ∈Wu,t. Putting
it all together,
PrG [A ∧H(u) = t] = PrG [H(u) = t] PrG [A | H(u) = t]
=
∑
w∈Wu,t
PrG [w] IA(w)
=
∑
w∈Wu,t
PrG′ [w] IA(w)
= PrG′ [A ∧H(u) = t]
C Proof of Corollaries to Theorem 2
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose f(v) ≥ 2f(u), then f ′(v) ≥ f(v)− g(u, v) ≥ f(v)− f(u) ≥ 2f(u)−
f(u) = f(u) = f ′(u).
Proof of Corollary 2. Let A = {v : f(v) ≥ (1 + γ)f(u) ∧ f ′(v) ≤ f ′(u)} be the set of all such
nodes. Then ∑
v∈A
f(v) ≥ |A|(1 + γ)f(u),∑
v∈A
f ′(v) ≤ |A|f ′(u) = |A|f(u),
so
∑
v∈A f(v)− f ′(v) ≥ γ|A|f(u). But by part (iii) of Theorem 2, f(v)− f ′(v) ≤ g(u, v), so
γ|A|f(u) ≤
∑
v∈A
f(v)− f ′(v) ≤
∑
v∈A
g(u, v) ≤ g(u) ≤ 1
α
f(u),
hence |A| ≤ 1αγ .
D Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Suppose we perform k walks, letting zv = 1k · (# of walks that hit v before jumping) be the
estimate for f(v). The symmetric Chernoff bounds (see, e.g., [28] p. 64) give:
Pr [zv ≥ (1 + )f(v)] ≤ exp(−kf(v)2/3)
Pr [zv ≤ (1− )f(v)] ≤ exp(−kf(v)2/3)
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Recall that  = b−ab , so a = (1− )b, and b > (1 + )a. The probability that a low-reputation node
is misclassified is
Pr [zv ≥ b | f(v) ≤ a] ≤ Pr [zv ≥ b | f(v) = a]
≤ Pr [zv ≥ (1 + )f(v) | f(v) = a]
≤ exp(−ka2/3).
The probability that a high-reputation node is misclassified is
Pr [zv ≤ a | f(v) ≥ b] = Pr [zv ≤ (1− )b | f(v) ≥ b]
≤ Pr [zv ≤ (1− )f(v) | f(v) ≥ b]
≤ exp(−kf(v)2/3)
≤ exp(−ka2/3).
Choosing k ≥ 3 ln(1/δ)
a2
ensures that each node is misclassified with probability at most δ, so the
expected number of misclassified nodes is at most δ|V |. Furthermore, by the union bound, the
probability that any node is misclassified is at most |V | exp(−ka2/3), so choosing k ≥ 3 ln(|V |/δ)
a2
ensures that all nodes are classified correctly with probability at least 1− δ.
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